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Abstract: The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is one of the most common protocols
that are used for signaling function in Voice over IP (VoIP) networks. The SIP
protocol is very popular because of its flexibility, simplicity, and easy implementation,
so it is a target of many attacks. In this paper, we propose a new system to detect
the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (i.e. malformed message and invite flooding) and
Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) attack in the SIP based VoIP networks using
a linear Support Vector Machine with l1 regularization (i.e. l1-SVM) classifier. In
our approach, we project the SIP messages into a very high dimensional space using
string based n-gram features. Hence, a linear classifier is trained on the top of these
features. Our experimental results show that the proposed system detects malformed
message, invite flooding, and SPIT attacks with a high accuracy. In addition, the
proposed system outperformed other systems significantly in the detection speed.
Keywords: Machine learning, Support Vector Machines (SVMs), Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP), VoIP attacks.
1 Introduction
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a technology that enables the user to make voice
or telephone calls over the Internet Protocol (IP) networks. Since the internet has been, and
continues to be a prominent form of communication, the VoIP services are going to be a promising
communication medium because of its low cost and added features. VoIP systems have two main
functions: signaling function and media transmission function.
The most popular protocols developed for the signaling function are the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) and H.323 protocol. SIP [19] is an application layer protocol to create, modify,
and terminate real-time sessions between participants over an IP based network. Although
H.323 protocol is more powerful [16], SIP is more popular because it is flexible, simple, easy to
implement, and is based on ASCII messages (not binary messages as in H.323).
SIP is vulnerable to many attacks [33]. DoS attacks (i.e. malformed message and invite
flooding) can disrupt the VoIP service partially or totally. In addition, SPIT attacks are usually
Copyright ©2019 CC BY-NC
Efficient Detection of Attacks in SIP Based VoIP Networks
using Linear l1-SVM Classifier 519
used for products advertisement, harassment of subscribers, or convincing VoIP users to dial
specific numbers. Recent statistics showed that spam calls result in huge man labor losses,
especially for small business enterprises in the U.S. [32].
In this paper, we developed a machine learning (ML) system that decreases VoIP-SIP attacks
using a linear SVM classifier. Our contributions are: (i) Introducing a novel approach for VoIP-
SIP attacks detection using a fast linear SVM classifier; (ii) Using l1 regularizer in the objective
function that leads to sparse solutions1; (iii) Comparing our results with the published state-of-
the art systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the related work,
with a focus on the ML approaches. In section 3, we describe the proposed approach to detect
VoIP-SIP attacks. Data is explained in section 4. Experimental setup is illustrated in section 5.
Finally, section 6 concludes the paper and discusses future work.
2 Related work
Decreasing VoIP attacks is a hot topic of research in the last few years. Hosseinpour et al. [9]
used a Finite State Machine (FSM) to extract parameters of the SIP traffic in normal conditions.
These parameters are used with fuzzy logic to detect DoS attacks. Tsiatsikas et al. [27] detected
DoS attacks which exploit the SIP message body. They built a Session Description Protocol
(SDP) parser using 100 rules, which achieved a high accuracy.
Machine learning (ML) is an artificial intelligence approach that creates a model to recog-
nize some patterns based on training examples. The ML task usually consists of three phases:
choosing a learning algorithm, training the algorithm using the training dataset, and evaluating
the algorithm performance by running it on another dataset (test-dataset). The detection of
VoIP-SIP attacks using ML methods is introduced in many research work. Nassar et al. [14]
extracted a set of 38 features from a slice of SIP messages, a SVM classifier decides if this vector
is anomaly or not and issues an event, the event correlator uses a set of rules and conditions to
filter the classifier events and generates alarms when necessary.
Akbar et al. [2] introduced Packet-based SIP Intrusion Protector (PbSIP) to prevent SIP
flooding attacks and SPIT. PbSIP contains a packet-based analyzer that uses a set of spatial and
temporal features to reduce the required processing and memory, features computation module,
and Naive Bayes and J48 classifiers. In addition, Asgharian et al. [3] introduced a set of 18
statistics features calculated from SIP headers. They used a SVM classifier to evaluate the
proposed features. Pougajendy et al. [17] used a subset of [3] features plus 2 new features, they
evaluated the proposed features using a SVM classifier.
Rieck et al. [18] converted the SIP message to a high-dimensional vector space using n-gram
tokens. They measured the Euclidean distance between a new message and a built model to
detect anomalous messages. Tang et al. [24] proposed a prevention and detection system of SIP
flooding attacks. They integrated a three-dimensional sketch design with the Hellinger Distance
(HD) technique.
In [23] Su et al. extracted 23 features to detect SPIT attacks using k-nearest neighbor
classifier. They added weight to each feature using a genetic algorithm. Vennila et al. [29]
introduced two phases model; a SVM classifier to classify the traffic into VoIP and non-VoIP,
and an entropy model to classify the VoIP traffic into flooding and non-flooding. Later, in [30]
they proposed another two phases model to detect SPIT callers, which used Markov Chain, and
incremental SVM classifier.
1By sparse solutions we mean that most of the parameters of the model are zeros.
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In [25] Tsiatsikas et al. proposed an oﬄine system to detect Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks,
they calculated the occurrence of 6 mandatory headers of SIP message, and implemented headers
anonymization using HMAC. They tried 5 classifiers to find the best false alarm rate. Later,
in [26] they proposed a real-time detection system and tried a group of DDoS scenarios.
Akbar et al. [1] used kernel tree analysis instead of features extraction, and a SVM clas-
sifier to detect malformed DDos attacks. In [21] Semerci et al. detected DDoS attacks using
a change-point method which detects the change of Mahalanobis distance between successive
feature vectors. If the change exceeds a threshold, the system labeled this as an attack. Kurt et
al. [12] extracted a set of features from SIP messages and server logs. A Hidden Markov Model
was used to relate these features to hidden variables, and a Bayesian multiple change model used
these variables as change point indicators to detect DDoS flooding attacks. Le et al. [13] built
a large data-set using a developed interface over a mobile application, which enables the user to
label the malicious calls. They started with 29 features and reduced them to 10 features. Many
machine learning models were tried (i.e. SVM and neural networks).
We observed a few issues in the developed systems described above. The feature extraction
methods based on hand-crafted features are not generic, and tuned for specific datasets and
attacks [3,14,23]. Hence, there is a need to develop a generic feature extraction method that is
suitable for many attacks. Besides, the classification approaches based on distance measures and
static threshold are not immune to noisy datasets [9, 29]. Moreover, the dual SVM methods are
known to be slow due to the kernel calculations [1, 17]. Furthermore, low detection accuracy in
general [21] or in case of low-rate attack [24] were observed. Lastly, rules-based systems require
deep knowledge of SIP and numerous manual work [27].
These drawbacks led to the need for a system to detect VoIP-SIP attacks with high detection
accuracy and a little processing time. To achieve this, we used the n-gram technique to extract
features from SIP messages, and linear l1-SVM to classify these messages into normal or attack.
3 Proposed approach
Detection of SIP attacks is formulated based on a ML approach. It consists of two steps.
The first step is to project the messages into a high-dimensional space since they are more likely
to be linearly separable than low-dimensional space [5], as illustrated in Figure 1. A method
based on extracting n-gram tokens from a SIP message is used to generate the high-dimensional
space. The second step is to use a linear SVM classifier with l1 regularization to detect the SIP
attacks. This classification algorithm optimizes the primal soft-margin objective function, and
it is much faster than optimizing the dual objective functions with kernels that were used in the
previous research [3, 14,17].
3.1 Features extraction
In order to classify the SIP messages into normal or attack, the SIP messages are converted
into numerical feature vectors. The features can be based on heuristics and domain knowledge
as in [3,23]. The disadvantage of this approach is that the generated features do not capture the
diversity of the SIP messages, and they are highly tuned for specific attacks. Alternatively, they
can be generated using a generic mathematical method like n-gram tokens as in [18]. The n-gram
methods are widely used in speech and language processing [11] and in the network intrusion
detection [31].
The SIP message is converted to a feature vector by moving a window of length n over the
message and extracting all sub-strings (n-gram tokens). The length of the feature vector equals
the number of unique n-grams in the training set. For each n-gram, we compute the number
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Figure 1: Moving to three-dimensional space, a nonlinear decision boundary for a two-dimensional classification
problem becomes linear
of its occurrences in the message and use it to set its value in the feature vector. Figure 2
summarizes the features extraction process (n=4).
Figure 2: A part of a SIP message, its n-grams, and the occurrences of n-grams in the message
Although the extraction of features based on n-gram tokens provides a generic and an
effective way for representing the SIP message, the length of the resulting feature vector is very
large, which slows down the detection speed in the classification process. To overcome this
problem, we set a cutoff hyper-parameter, and add to the feature vector the n-grams that exceed
the cutoff.
3.2 Linear l1-SVM classifier
Given a training set D that has m examples:
D = [(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)], (1)
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where yi are either 1 or -1, each indicating the class to which the point xi belongs (i.e. normal or
attack). Each xi is a d-dimensional real vector (i.e. the unique numbers of n−gram tokens in the
training set). The soft-margin SVM classifier is computed by minimizing the primal objective
function given by:
J = minw
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
max (0, 1− yi(w · xi − b))
]
+ λ‖w‖2, (2)
where w is the vector of the parameters and max (0, 1− yi(w · xi − b)) is the hinge loss function.
The term ‖w‖2 is the l2 regularization penalty. The hyper-parameter λ is used to determine the
trade-off between increasing the margin-size and ensuring that the xi lie on the correct side of
the margin.
The l2 regularization penalty in Equation 2 does not lead to sparse solutions. The l1 = ‖w‖
regularizer or Lasso penalty is often used to increase the model sparseness since it can lead to
solutions that have some elements with zero values [8]. In the proposed system, regularization is
implemented by adding the l1 norm penalty term to the hinge loss criterion (i.e. linear l1-SVM
classifier):
J = minw
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
max (0, 1− yi(w · xi − b))
]
+ λ‖w‖, (3)
In real implementation of Equation 3, the hinge loss is weighted by C:
J = minw
[
C
m∑
i=1
max (0, 1− yi(w · xi − b))
]
+ ‖w‖, (4)
where the hyper-parameter C = 1mλ .
The solution of this objective function can be used to classify new points z:
c = sgn(w · z − b) (5)
where c is the class identifier and b is a bias term.
The primal objective function in Equation 2 is commonly solved using a dual form with the
Lagrangian [4, 28]. The dual form is given by:
J = minα
m∑
i=1
αi − 1
2
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
yiαik(xi · xj)yjαj , (6)
subject to
m∑
i=1
αiyi = 0, and 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1
2mλ
; for all i. (7)
where α are the parameters to optimize and k(xi ·xj) is a kernel function. Some common kernels
functions are: Polynomial (homogeneous): k(xi, xj) = (xi · xj)d , Gaussian radial basis function:
k(xi, xj) = exp(−γ‖xi−xj‖2), for γ > 0, and Hyperbolic tangent: k(xi, xj) = tanh(κxi · xj + c),
for some (not every) κ > 0 and c < 0. The new points z can be classified by computing:
c = sgn
([
m∑
i=1
αiyik(xi, z)
]
− b
)
, (8)
The main advantage of the dual form solution is producing a nonlinear classifier. However, it
is slow in training (i.e. O(m2)) and classification phases due to the usage of kernels [3,14,17]. On
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the other hand, the linear l1-SVM classifier optimizes the primal soft-margin objective function,
and is much faster than optimizing the dual objective functions with kernels.
The detection time is an important factor in the detection of attacks, and the dual form
classifiers (i.e. Equation 8) may not be suitable for this task. The linear l1-SVM classifier
detection in Equation 5 is relatively fast. Hence, our main classifier is based on the primal form
objective function solutions.
4 Data
To evaluate the proposed system, we need VoIP datasets. Unfortunately, real VoIP datasets
are not available because of privacy concerns, so we used two generated datasets.
The first dataset was produced by INRIA [15]. They used two SIP proxy servers (i.e.
Opensips and Asterisk), and VoIP attack tools to generate different scenarios of the invite flooding
and SPIT attacks. The test-bed consists of a PC that acts as a server, two PCs generate the
normal traffic using VoIP bots, and a PC that generates the attack messages. This dataset
contains about 266,450 SIP messages.
In addition, the SIP-Msg-Gen tool [7] was used to generate the second dataset. It is a syn-
thetic SIP message generator that generates normal SIP messages according to the SIP grammar
defined in the RFC 3261 [19], and malformed SIP messages according to the SIP test messages
defined in RFC 4475 [22]. The SIP-Msg-Gen tool can generate 14 different scenarios of the mal-
formed SIP messages. All of these scenarios were used in the dataset generation. This dataset
contains about 246,750 SIP messages.
For all experiments, we divided each dataset into three parts, 60% for training, 20% for
cross validation, and 20% for testing. The training dataset was used to build the classification
model. The cross validation dataset was used to tune the model hyper-parameters, and the test
dataset was used to evaluate the final detection accuracy of the model.
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluated the proposed approach using INRIA and SIP-Msg-Gen datasets.
We projected the SIP messages into a high-dimensional space, and a linear l1-SVM classifier was
used for detection. In our proposed system we aim to achieve fast and high detection accuracy.
Hence, we turned our attention to the primal form SVMs with l1 regularization (i.e. linear
l1-SVM) to produce a sparse solution that will accelerate the detection process and decrease
the number of active features. We compared the primal form SVMs with the dual form SVMs
classifier. LibLinear [6] was used for the primal form l1-SVM experiments. It is an open source
library that solves large scale linear classification problems, and supports l1 and l2 regularizations.
In addition, the LibSVM toolkit [10] was sued for dual form SVM experiments. All experiments
are done in a machine with Intel Core i5 CPU, 3.2 GHz Quad-core and 8 GB RAM memory.
5.1 Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our proposed model, we used F1 score [20]. It is the harmonic
average of the precision and recall that takes into account the false positives and false negatives.
The precision is the number of positive predictions divided by the total number of positive class
predicted:
Precision =
True Positive
True Positive + False Positive
, (9)
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and the recall is the number of positive predictions divided by number of positive class values.
Recall =
True Positive
True Positive + False Negative
. (10)
The F1 score is given by:
F1 = 2 ∗ Precision * Recall
Precision + Recall
(11)
where the precision and recall equally contributed into F1 score. The best F1 score is 1 and
the worst is 0. The F1 score is usually more useful than accuracy, especially in case of different
classes distribution.
The model sparseness was measured using the compression ratio (CR) criterion, given by
CR(C) =
#Param - #Pram(C)
#Param
(12)
where #Param is the number of features before the training process and #Pram(C) is the number
of features after the training process, and is a function of the C parameter.
The target of the proposed system is to maximize the detection accuracy and minimize the
required time for message classification. The average detection time Tdetection is computed as
follows:
Tdetection =
Features Extraction Time + Detection Time
# Messages in Test Dataset
(13)
where the features extraction time is the total time required to compute the features for all
messages in the test dataset and the detection time is the total time required to run the l1-SVM
classifier on the test dataset. The average train time Ttrain was computed using the same equation
but over the training dataset.
5.2 Results
The proposed classifier was trained using the training dataset and different values of the
hyper-parameter C were tried to achieve the best detection accuracy. The F1 score, Tdetection,
CR (C), and Ttrain were reported for these experiments.
Our first experiment was performed on INRIA dataset, the feature vectors were created
using n-gram with n=4 and cutoff=5. All n-grams that existed in the training dataset more
than 5 times are stored in the dictionary, the dictionary of INRIA dataset have 120,209 4-grams.
This dictionary was used to create feature vectors for the cross validation and the test datasets.
Then the primal form l1-SVM classifier was tried with different C values.
In the second experiment, we used SIP-Msg-Gen dataset with the same hyper-parameters
(n=4 and cutoff=5), and the dictionary has 290,166 4-grams. The size of this dictionary is bigger
than the INRIA dictionary because the malformed messages usually contain random content.
The F1 Score for INRIA and SIP-Msg-Gen datasets with different C values is shown in
figure 3. For INRIA dataset, the l1-primal SVM classifier achieved 100% detection accuracy at
C= 0.0039063 using only 37 features out of the 120,209 in 0.737 milliseconds average detection
time per message. For the SIP-Msg-Gen dataset, the 100% detection accuracy is achieved at C=
0.5 using 9,800 features out of the 290,166 features in 0.570 milliseconds.
Figure 4 shows the results of CR for INRIA and SIP-Msg-Gen datasets. Because a high
detection accuracy was achieved with a few number of features, the compression ratio for both
datasets is high. INRIA achived 99% compression ratio while SIP-Msg-Gen achieved 96% com-
pression ratio.
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Figure 3: F1 score for INRIA and SIP-Msg-Gen datasets
The SIP-Msg-Gen dataset contains malformed messages, which usually have random content
more than the invite flooding and SPIT messages in INRIA dataset. Hence, the l1-SVM primal
classifier needs more features with the SIP-Msg-Gen dataset to achieve high accuracy, and this
leads to the low compression ratio with this dataset compared with the INRIA dataset.
Figure 4: Compression ratio for INRIA and SIP-Msg-Gen datasets
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Moreover, we calculated the proposed system throughput in megabits per second (Mbps) to
measure the run-time performance. We achieved 2,700 Mbps using INRIA dataset, and 2,500
Mbps using SIP-Msg-Gen dataset which is considered a high throughput compared with previous
work such as [18].
One of the important constraints for any learning algorithm is its scalability. When dealing
with very large datasets, the dual form SVMs with kernels will be much slower than the primal
form SVMs in detection and training. Although a fast detection is important, the fast training
is also important especially in the case of the online adaption of the system.
Comparing between the dual form SVM with RBF kernel and the primal form SVM when
both of them achieved 100% detection accuracy is given in Table 1. The primal form training
time was about 17 times faster than the dual form using the INRIA dataset, and about 400
times faster with the SIP-Msg-Gen dataset. The detection time of the primal form was about 13
times faster than the dual form using the INRIA dataset, and about 100 times faster with the
SIP-Msg-Gen dataset. This dual form setup is similar to the one used in [3].
Table 1: Comparison between the training time and the detection time for the primal and the dual form SVMs
Dataset SVM Ttrain Tdetection
INRIA Primal 0.7445 ms 0.7370 ms
INRIA Dual-RBF 13.0130 ms 10.1331 ms
SIP-Msg-Gen Primal 0.5757 ms 0.5702 ms
SIP-Msg-Gen Dual-RBF 219.5450 ms 57.0270 ms
Finally, we compared our linear l1-SVM classifier to the state-of-the-art systems in Table
2. This comparison can only be considered as an indicator that the linear l1-SVM classifier
outperforms the other systems in terms of speed (detection time), because many factors such as
the hardware configuration and the test dataset are different.
Table 2: Comparison between linear l1-SVM and state-of-the-art systems.
Method Performance Tdetection Attacks
linear l1-SVM F1 100% 1
F1 100%
0.7370 ms
0.5702 ms
Flooding and SPIT
Malformed Msgs
Change Point [21] F1 88% 0.76 ±0.45 sec DDoS
Bayesian Change Point [12] F1 95% – DDoS
Markov Chain and SVM [30] Acc. 96.3% 15.145 ms SPIT
Dual SVM [3] Acc. 95-97% – Flooding
Sketch Design and
Hellinger Distance [24]
Acc. 88% 2
Acc. 100%
– Flooding
Dual SVM [17] Acc. 99.9% 0.057-0.384 sec Flooding
SDP Parser [27] Acc. 100% 17-60 ms Malformed Msgs
Dual SVM [1] Acc. 99.9% – (D)DoS
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a machine learning system to detect the attacks of SIP based VoIP
networks. The system projects the messages into a high-dimensional feature vector using n-gram
1F1 in the case of INRIA and SIP-Msg-Gen datasets respectively.
2Accuracy of low-rate and high-rate attack respectively.
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tokens. In addition, a linear classifier to detect the SIP attacks (i.e. l1-SVM classifier) is used
for classification. Our work considers the fact that optimizing the primal soft-margin objective
function is much faster than optimizing the dual objective function with kernels. Hence, we
avoid the main drawback of the traditional dual form SVMs. Using the INRIA and SIP-Msg-
Gen datasets, the proposed linear l1-SVM classifier achieved competitive detection results to the
other systems. Moreover, it is much faster than the state-of-the-art systems in the detection
speed. Future work may focus on capturing a real VoIP dataset from a site under many VoIP
attacks.
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